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# Adaptation to Democracy among Immigrants in Australia

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## Abstract

This article examines adaptation to democracy among immigrants who leave authoritarian regimes to settle in Australia. Two questions are addressed. First, do immigrants from authoritarian regimes successfully adapt to democracy, in terms of both supporting democracy and participating in the electoral process? And second, does the pre-migration socialization in authoritarian regimes influence immigrants' democratic transition? Using the 2004 Australian Election Study and the Australian section of the 2005 World Values Survey, the findings indicate that if immigrants from authoritarian regimes lag behind the rest of the population in terms of support for democracy, they tend to participate at least as much as the rest of the population in electoral activities. Overall, the study highlights both the persistence of and the change in immigrants' pre-migration political orientations.

## Keywords

immigrants, migrants, refugees

Across the world, a large and increasing flow of immigrants leaves authoritarian regimes each year to settle in the established democracies. Those newcomers who migrate from authoritarian regimes to established democracies are confronted with democratic norms and practices late in life, after having been socialized under authoritarian rules. There is a growing concern in the host societies that public authorities should ensure that these new citizens will adapt to their new democratic political system and that they will learn and adhere to democratic norms and practices. How well do these new citizens absorb democratic values, and what can governments do to ensure a smooth assimilation?

To address this question, we investigate the adaptation to democracy among immigrants who leave an authoritarian regime to settle in an established democracy. Such an investigation requires addressing the persistence of the political socialization that immigrants from authoritarian regimes received in their country of origin, as well as their capacity for new learning once in the host country.

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In spite of the large amount of research on the question of persistence of political socialization after childhood (recent examples include: Niemi and Hepburn, 1995; Sears and Funk, 1999), rarely have scholars had the opportunity to investigate the persistence of early political socialization under circumstances where the political system in which individuals live changes in a drastic manner. This article examines such a case of drastic political change by investigating immigrants who leave an authoritarian political system for a democratic one. From a theoretical perspective, then, our question is: what happens to people socialized under authoritarian rules once they start a new life in a democratic political system? Do their pre-migration socialization and experiences under authoritarian regimes influence their adaptation to democracy?

Australia is a particularly appropriate case study since the country currently hosts the world's largest proportion of immigrants (25 percent of the population is foreign-born) and is increasingly accepting immigrants from authoritarian regimes.<sup>1</sup> In 1955 approximately 20 percent of new immigrants who settled in Australia had little experience of democracy; currently this proportion has risen to more than 50 percent.<sup>2</sup> The issue of immigrants' adaptation to democracy is thus particularly salient to Australia. At stake is immigrants' capacity to acquire a political voice and to have their needs and demands adequately addressed, two cornerstones of democracy (Verba et al., 1995). Furthermore, it also represents a challenge for social and political cohesion, where the goal is a common understanding among all citizens, old and new, of what are the democratic rules of the game (Putnam, 2000). This article investigates these issues using two recent surveys, the *2004 Australian Election Study* and its over-sample of immigrants and the 2005 Australian component of the *World Values Survey*.

## **Immigrants' Political Adaptation: The Impact of Pre-migration Experiences**

The question of whether immigrants from authoritarian regimes adapt to democracy cannot be addressed without answering the broader question of people's political socialization throughout their life cycle. More specifically, immigrants' capacity to adapt to democracy is dependent on the extent to which political attitudes are open to change after childhood. In this regard, two main perspectives contradict each other and lead to conflicting expectations with respect to the prospects for immigrants' adaptation to democracy. On the one hand, the persistence perspective claims that political socialization starts early in childhood and that during these early years individuals form political beliefs and values that will crystallize and become resistant to change for the remainder of their lives (Easton and Dennis, 1969). On the other hand, the lifelong openness perspective claims that political socialization research has overemphasized the stability of political beliefs and values acquired early in life and instead argues that political attitudes evolve throughout the life cycle to adjust to new life experiences and society's expectations (see Sears, 1990 for a review).<sup>3</sup>

The literature on political socialization has provided mixed evidence about the persistence of early learned political orientations. In terms of political support, scholars like David Easton (1975) have presented the fundamental form of support for a political regime and its principles (diffuse support) as resistant or immune to change, at least in the short term. Others, for example Rogowski (1974), have instead proposed a conception of political support that fluctuates with government turnover and regime performance. This perspective has received significant support in recent works studying political support in newly democratizing countries (Mishler and Rose, 1996, 2001, 2002). In terms of political participation and voting, there is evidence pointing to both persistence and change, with early learned political orientations as well as short-term considerations

simultaneously predicting people's political behaviors (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Rose and McAllister, 1990). As insightful as they might be about the general process of political socialization, none of the above studies was concerned primarily with the specific situation experienced by immigrants, especially those who have lived most of their lives under an authoritarian regime and who then move to another country to start a new life under a democratic political system.

For immigrants, underlying this theoretical debate about the persistence or openness of people's attitudes is the question of how persistent immigrants' pre-migration attitudes and behaviors will be and how much influence they will have on their political adaptation in the host country. More specifically, for immigrants from authoritarian regimes the persistence perspective suggests an enduring impact of pre-migration experiences and implies difficulties for immigrants in coping with the new demands of democracy; their pre-migration political socialization in authoritarian regimes would reflect the authoritarianism of the donor society and impede their democratic adaptation. On the opposite side, the openness perspective suggests a weak impact of pre-migration experiences; it implies that immigrants from authoritarian regimes may hold political attitudes that contrast with those of the local population upon arrival in the host country but that these political attitudes will gradually conform to democratic norms and expectations.

What has research on immigrants' political adaptation discovered about the enduring impact of pre-migration political experiences? Several studies have investigated the impact of pre-migration experiences on immigrants' adaptation, most by comparing immigrants' political attitudes with those in their donor countries. The evidence suggests a systematic correlation between immigrants' political attitudes and their country of origin. First, investigating the case of American and Soviet immigrants in Israel, Gitelman (1982) has demonstrated that immigrants from the USSR were less trustful, less efficacious but more deferential and respectful of authority than their counterparts from the United States, and that these differences were enduring over the years. Similarly, McAllister and Makkai's (1992) study of Australian immigrants has shown that newcomers from countries with a shorter democratic history (from Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia) exhibit a more authoritarian political outlook than the Australian-born population and immigrants from Northern Europe and the United Kingdom. Finally, using the *World Values Surveys*, Rice and Feldman (1997) demonstrate a correlation between the civic attitudes (civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust, and tolerance) of American citizens and the level of civic attitudes in their ancestors' country of origin. Their study indicates that Americans whose families migrated from countries with stronger civic attitudes are more likely to hold these civic attitudes, and conversely those whose families came from countries with weaker civic attitudes are less likely to hold these same attitudes.

A similar relationship has been observed for immigrants' political participation. In the United States, Simpson Bueker (2005) indicates that immigrants coming from non-democratic regimes are less likely to turn out to vote than those from democratic countries, a conclusion that is confirmed by Ramakrishnan (2005).<sup>4</sup> And in Canada, Harles (1997) indicates that immigrants from Laos refer to their pre-migration political experiences to justify their reluctance to participate and discuss politics. Finally, Bilodeau (2008), in his comparative study of Canada and Australia, finds that immigrants who experienced authoritarianism prior to their arrival in the host country are more reluctant to participate in unconventional forms of activities, especially signing petitions.

Overall, then, many studies on immigrants' political adaptation have observed a relationship between immigrants' pre-migration political experiences (or country of origin), on the one hand, and their political attitudes and patterns of participation in the host country, on the other. This evidence supports the persistence perspective of political socialization, highlighting the importance of early learned and pre-migration political outlooks. Applied to Australia, this suggests

that immigrants from authoritarian regimes could experience a difficult adaptation to democracy, having to balance pre-migration experiences with the requirements of democracy. What does this mean in terms of hypotheses with regard to our proposed investigations on immigrants' adaptation to democracy? But first, what do we mean by a successful adaptation to democracy?

## **Defining a Successful Adaptation to Democracy**

The most fundamental condition of a successful adaptation to democracy is that newcomers support democracy, defined here as "a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives" (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 76). Democracy is the heart of Australia's political system and therefore without widespread public support for democracy there can be no legitimacy for the political system. Therefore, using David Easton's terminology (1975), we argue that a successful adaptation to democracy starts with newcomers developing support for the "political regime" of their host country.

To evaluate support for democracy we refer to benchmarks that have been employed in more conventional research relating to transitions to democracy. According to Linz and Stepan (1996: 5), support for democracy is most profound when democracy becomes the "only game in town." As Bratton and Mattes put it: "democracy is consolidated when citizens ... conclude that no alternative form of regime has any greater subjective validity or stronger objective claim to their allegiance" (2001a: 447–74). Without such strong and exclusive support, democracy must compete against rival alternatives, a problem that transitional democracies often face (Bratton and Mattes, 2001b; Lagos, 2001; Rose et al., 1998). In the established democracies it is unlikely that continued support for non-democratic regimes by immigrants (or even some segments of the local population) could be as threatening to democracy. Still, immigrants' support for democracy and its alternatives serves as a useful indicator of the depth of their democratic support.

A successful adaptation to democracy requires more than simply developing democratic support. As Ichilov argues, democracy is more than passive compliance and support: "Citizens are also required to make choices, decisions, and judgments, to criticize and to object" (Ichilov, 1990: 1). Without citizen participation in the political process, a democratic political system cannot function effectively or even claim to be fully democratic. Therefore, the second part of our exploration investigates the extent to which pre-migration experiences of authoritarianism influence immigrants' participation in one of the most widespread and obvious types of political activities in a democracy, namely electoral activities.

## **Hypotheses**

In terms of immigrants' support both for democracy and its alternatives and for electoral participation, the evidence suggests that immigrants' pre-migration experiences of authoritarianism, defined here as experiences with any regime in which rulers are not held accountable for their actions and in which citizens or their representatives have limited or no input in government affairs, should be enduring and influence immigrants' adaptation to democracy.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, upon arrival in the host country we expect immigrants from authoritarian regimes to exhibit weaker democratic support and to participate less in electoral activities than the Australian-born population and other immigrants from democratic countries.

So far, however, we have assumed that immigrants from authoritarian regimes form a homogeneous group, which oversimplifies the diversity of their political experiences. For one thing, not all

countries are equally authoritarian or democratic; some countries (e.g. China) rank as highly authoritarian, whereas others (e.g. Bangladesh and Indonesia) rank as moderately authoritarian, according to institutions monitoring democracy around the world such as the Freedom House. The argument here is that it is not enough to consider whether immigrants come from an authoritarian regime or not; we must also consider the intensity of the authoritarian practices that immigrants experienced in order to assess the impact of pre-migration political socialization on their adaptation to democracy. In his study of immigrants' participation in unconventional political activities, Bilodeau (2008) highlights that the greater the experience of political repression by immigrants, the lower their participation in a wide range of unconventional activities. Accordingly, we expect to observe a similar finding with regard to support for democracy and participation in electoral activities. Thus, our first hypothesis is:

*H1: The more authoritarian immigrants' pre-migration experience of politics is, the weaker their democratic support and the lower their participation in electoral activities.*

Furthermore, it would also be wrong to assume that the extent of authoritarian practices in the country of origin fully captures the extent of one's exposure to authoritarianism. The age at which immigrants leave their country of origin, or the length of time that immigrants are exposed to authoritarian practices, could also be a significant determinant. An immigrant who left Russia for Australia at the age of 10, for example, is not likely to have accumulated the same experience of authoritarianism as an immigrant who left Russia at the age of 40. Intuitively, we expect that the continuous accumulation of authoritarian experiences with politics over the years would reinforce the influence of those pre-migration experiences on immigrants' political outlooks and on their adaptation to democracy, but very few studies have examined such a hypothesis. Supporting this argument, McAllister and Makkai (1992: 283) demonstrate that the longer immigrants had lived in non-democratic countries, the more authoritarian their political outlooks were once in Australia.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, our second hypothesis is:

*H2: The longer immigrants were exposed to authoritarianism prior to migration, the weaker their democratic support and the lower their participation in electoral activities.*

Lastly, it is conceivable that the length of time that an immigrant has been residing in Australia may also be relevant. In the same way that a prolonged exposure to authoritarianism could strengthen the impact of pre-migration experiences on immigrants' adaptation to democracy, so the longer immigrants reside in Australia the weaker could be the impact of these pre-migration experiences, reflecting acculturation over time. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that the impact of the authoritarian socialization weakens over time once immigrants settle in a democratic country. Of all the studies explicitly examining the differences in political outlooks between immigrants from authoritarian and democratic regimes, none that addressed the issue of change in immigrants' political outlooks by looking at length of residence reported any significant modification in newcomers' authoritarian outlooks over time (see Bilodeau, 2008; Gitelman, 1982; McAllister and Makkai, 1992). Therefore, because the evidence suggests more persistence than change with an increased length of residence in the host country, we expect that:

*H3: Immigrants from authoritarianism will not develop stronger democratic support and greater participation in electoral activities the longer they live in the host country.*

## Research Design and Data

Our analytical approach is to assess whether immigrants from authoritarian regimes adapt to democracy not in absolute but in relative terms. To do so, we compare levels of democratic support and political participation among three groups of survey respondents in Australia: (1) immigrants from authoritarian regimes; (2) immigrants from democratic countries; and (3) the Australian-born population. We do not expect, of course, that even in populations born and socialized in a democratic regime everyone will be highly supportive of democracy or highly involved in the political process. Our objective is to examine whether levels of democratic support and participation among immigrants from authoritarian regimes differ from those of other respondents socialized in a democratic political system, and to what extent pre-migration experiences of authoritarianism influence immigrants' adaptation.

To determine the type of political socialization that immigrants received prior to migration we rely on the democratic/authoritarian status of the country of origin from Freedom House and various historical sources.<sup>7</sup> Immigrants are thus classified according to the degree of authoritarian practices in their country of origin, using a score that ranges between 0 and 12. This score is obtained by merging the average Freedom House country scores on both civil liberties and political rights for the 10-year period prior to immigrants' departure from their country of origin; 0 means no authoritarian practices in the country of origin and 12 means strong authoritarian practices.<sup>8</sup> In other words, if a Russian immigrant arrived in Australia in 1995, the political status of her country of origin will be based on the situation in Russia between 1985 and 1995. For a complete classification listing of the immigrants investigated in this analysis, please refer to Appendix A.

To test the second hypothesis, we developed an alternative measure of immigrants' experience of authoritarianism that takes into account both the degree of authoritarian practices and the age at which immigrants left their country of origin. We obtained this alternative indicator of authoritarian experience by multiplying the level of authoritarian practices in the country of origin (from 0 to 12 as specified above) by the log of the age at which the person migrated to Australia. We use the log of age at migration because this function is most consistent with theories of political socialization claiming that political learning generally occurs during the early years of life, and then rapidly decreases in importance throughout the life cycle (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989). This new variable ranges from 0 to 49, where 0 means no experience of authoritarianism prior to migration (no authoritarian practices and/or a short exposure to it) and 49 means a strong experience (widespread authoritarian practices and long exposure).

Lastly, data on support for democracy and political participation are drawn from the 2004 *Australian Election Study (AES)* and the 2005 Australian component of the *World Values Survey (WVS)*. The *AES* data include a special boosted sample of immigrants, which increases the total number of immigrants available for analysis. In all, the *AES* sample includes 256 immigrants from democratic regimes, 306 immigrants from authoritarian regimes, and 1,373 respondents who were born in Australia. The 2005 Australian component of the *WVS* contains a sample of 196 immigrants from democratic regimes, 126 immigrants from authoritarian regimes, and 1,060 locally born respondents (see Table 1).<sup>9</sup> All immigrant respondents are Australian citizens.<sup>10</sup>

## Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives

We begin by examining the degree to which immigrants from authoritarian regimes support democracy. Both the *AES* and *WVS* contain a similar battery of questions asking respondents about



**Table 1.** Sample Sizes and Distributions

	2004 AES	2005 WVS Australia
Australian-born respondents	1373	1060
Immigrants		
Democratic countries	256	196
Authoritarian countries	306	126

Sources: 2005 Australian component of the *World Values Survey*; 2004 *Australian Election Study* and its over-sample of immigrants.

**Table 2.** Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives

Percentage saying it is a good (very and fairly good) thing to have these forms of governments	Local population	Immigrants from countries:	
		Democratic	Authoritarian
<b>2004 Australian Election Study</b>			
Democratic political system	91	91	88
A strong leader who does not have to bother with elections and parliament	18	19	40*
The army runs the country	5	2	17*
N <sup>1</sup>	1257	226	274
<b>2005 World Values Survey (Australia)</b>			
Democratic political system	89	94	91
A strong leader who does not have to bother with elections and parliament	20	20	40*
The army runs the country	6	6	13*
N <sup>1</sup>	1025	192	117

Notes: \*: t-test: difference with immigrants from democratic countries is statistically significant at least at .05 level.

1. Number of cases varies for each item. Numbers do not go below those reported.

Sources: 2004 *Australian Election Study* and its over-sample of immigrants and the 2005 Australian component of the *World Values Survey*.

their views on various types of political systems. When asked about the democratic political system, the results from both the *AES* and *WVS* data (see Table 2) indicate that around 9 out of 10 respondents, regardless of where they were socialized, agree that democracy provides a good form of governance.<sup>11</sup> What these findings suggest, therefore, is that a strong majority of immigrants who make the transition from non-democratic societies to democratic ones are clearly supportive of democracy. But how exclusive is their support for democracy? Do they consider other forms of government as also viable?

To evaluate the depth of immigrants' democratic support, we also examined views toward two alternative types of political systems that are, to differing degrees, not as democratic. First, respondents in both the *AES* and *WVS* were asked about their views toward having a strong leader who bypasses the normal mechanisms of ensuring accountability in democratic regimes – parliament and elections. The non-democratic character of the “strong leader” regime is that it openly rejects two essential features of democracy: the deliberative role of legislative bodies and the role of elections in providing citizens with responsible elected officials (Schmitter and Karl, 1991).

Not surprisingly, support for this type of political system is much lower than support for democracy across all groups of respondents (see Table 2). It is noteworthy, however, that support for the

“strong leader” regime is stronger among immigrants who have experienced authoritarianism than among the rest of the population. According to the *AES*, 18 percent of Australian-born respondents and 19 percent of immigrants from democratic regimes are supportive of this form of political system. For immigrants from authoritarian regimes, support for this proposition increases to 40 percent. The corresponding figures for the *WVS* are almost identical, with 20 percent of Australian-born respondents and immigrants from democratic countries supporting the statement, compared with 40 percent of immigrants from authoritarian regimes.

Another type of political regime that is clearly non-democratic in character is governance by army rule. In this case, the results indicate that this type of political system is by far the least popular among the respondents. According to the *AES* data, only 5 percent of Australian-born respondents and 2 percent of immigrants from democratic countries support army rule. By comparison, however, significantly more immigrants from authoritarian regimes indicate that they would support such a regime (17 percent). Similarly, data from the *WVS* indicate that support for army rule is at 6 percent among both Australian-born respondents and immigrants from democratic countries, whereas among immigrants from authoritarian regimes support for this proposition is significantly higher at 13 percent.<sup>12</sup>

Immigrants from authoritarian regimes thus exhibit overwhelming support for democracy, but their degree of support appears considerably less exclusive than that of the rest of the population. In our view, this suggests an enduring impact of their pre-migration experience of authoritarianism; in comparison with citizens who were socialized in democracies, citizens of authoritarian regimes may not be as wedded to the democratic political system and this is consistent with the first hypothesis.

But is this weaker democratic support among immigrants from authoritarian regimes attributable to their pre-migration experience of authoritarianism? Previous research suggests that there are alternative explanations. Conventional theories of political participation and regime support suggest that an explanation may be variations in socioeconomic status (Milbrath, 1965; Verba and Nie, 1972). To the extent that democratic political systems may be more responsive to certain socioeconomic groups than others, it is possible that systematic differences in socioeconomic status between immigrants from authoritarian regimes and other respondents could potentially explain why support for democracy among the former is not as strong as among the latter. Also, it is possible that democracy is more appealing to certain types of individuals. For example, one prominent line of research indicates that people with post-materialist values tend to be more interested and engaged in the political process than those holding materialist outlooks (Nevitte, 1996), and consequently they may be more inclined to favor a more open political regime such as democracy than people with materialist values. Likewise, more extreme ideologies (right or left wing) may affect support for regime principles in different ways. Factors such as these may also, therefore, influence how democracy is viewed in relation to other political regimes, and so, to ensure that pre-migration experience of authoritarianism exerts a direct influence on immigrants' support for democracy, we now conduct multivariate analyses.<sup>13</sup>

The findings of our OLS analysis, which contains only immigrant respondents, are reported in Table 3. In order to capture Linz and Stepan's (1996) conception of support for democracy, the dependent variable that we employ combines indicators measuring support for democracy, support for a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections and parliament, and support for army rule. This 10-point scale ranges from 0 to 9, with 9 indicating respondents who strongly support democracy but strongly oppose repressive regimes and 0 indicating respondents who strongly oppose democracy and strongly support repressive regimes.<sup>14</sup> Because the methodology of the *AES* and *WVS* Australia are similar, the question wording is for the most part similar, and the analyses



**Table 3.** Predictors of Support for Democracy among Immigrants

	Dependent variable: exclusive support for democracy scale (0–9) AES and WVS merged data					
	Specification 1: Degree of authoritarian practices in country of origin (0–12 scale)			Specification 2: Degree of authoritarian practices and age at migration (0–49 scale)		
	B	RSE	Beta	B	RSE	Beta
<b>Authoritarian experience</b>	–.080	.017***	–.216	–.024	.006***	–.205
Length of residence	.005	.006	.040	.002	.006	.012
Age	.008	.007	.069	.013	.007	.109
Female	–.223	.152	–.064	–.194	.152	–.056
Education	.113	.095	.052	.082	.096	.038
Income	.173	.060**	.141	.184	.060**	.150
Employment status <sup>1</sup>						
Employed	–.270	.192	–.078	–.230	.190	–.067
Unemployed	–.337	.366	–.042	–.311	.365	–.040
Interest in politics	.333	.096**	.161	.341	.096***	.166
2005 interview	.002	.152	.001	.008	.152	.002
Satis. democracy	.282	.108*	.120	.294	.107**	.125
Left-wing ideology (0–5)	–.109	.078	–.076	–.121	.078	–.086
Right-wing ideology (0–5)	–.175	.061**	–.148	–.183	.061**	–.156
Materialist values	–.039	.055	–.031	–.044	.055	–.035
Constant	5.824	.545***		5.590	.538***	
N		539			532	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		.149			.145	

Notes: Entries report unstandardized OLS regression B coefficients and Beta coefficients. Regressions with robust standard errors.

\*\*\*: *p*-value < .001; \*\*: *p*-value < .01; \*: *p*-value < .05.

1. Reference category is inactive.

Sources: 2005 Australian component of *World Values Survey* and the *2004 Australian Election Study* and its over-sample of immigrants (merged together).

reported in Table 2 revealed quite similar patterns and levels of support for democracy and authoritarian regimes, the analyses that follow are based on merged data from the *AES* and *WVS* Australia surveys.<sup>15</sup> This strategy allows us to double the sample size for our multivariate analyses; major discrepancies between separate analyses for the *AES* and *WVS* that may affect the interpretation of the results are noted in the discussion.

The partial regression coefficient for the “Authoritarian experience scale” (–.080) indicates that the more severe immigrants’ experience of authoritarianism is, the less likely they are to see democracy as being the only acceptable system of governance.<sup>16</sup> These findings suggest that the experience of authoritarianism is the most powerful determinant of immigrants’ support for democracy (Beta = –.216). Everything else being equal, this means that there is a .96-point difference in support for democracy between immigrants coming from fully authoritarian and fully democratic regimes. These findings support our first hypothesis; the more authoritarian immigrants’ pre-migration experience of politics is, the less supportive of democracy they are.<sup>17</sup>

But what about the length of time that immigrants have been exposed to authoritarianism? To verify the impact of this factor we performed the same analysis by replacing our main independent variable measuring immigrants' experience of authoritarianism (0–12 scale) with our alternative scale that takes into account the age at which immigrants left their country of origin (0–49 scale). The results obtained using this alternative indicator are also statistically significant and negative ( $B = -.024$ ), suggesting that the more intense the practice of authoritarianism and the longer immigrants were exposed to such practices, the less supportive of democracy they are.<sup>18</sup> Interestingly, however, using this alternative indicator did not improve in any way the strength of the relationship (Beta:  $-.205$  vs.  $-.216$ ) or the overall fit of the model (adj.  $R^2$ :  $.145$  vs.  $.149$ ). Accordingly, parsimony tells us that, in assessing immigrants' support for democracy, we need to take into account the degree of authoritarian practices in the country of origin but can afford to exclude the length of time that immigrants were exposed to such authoritarian practices. There is thus little support for the second hypothesis.

Moreover, these results are robust in that they remain significant even after including all our control variables in the analysis. The only other significant relationships are the following: immigrants who are wealthy, interested in politics, and satisfied with democracy are more likely than those who are poor, less interested in politics, and less satisfied with democracy to support democracy over other systems of government.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, those to the right of the ideological spectrum appear less supportive of democracy than those to the center and to the left.

Using either specification of the authoritarian experience (0–12 scale or 0–49 scale), there is also no evidence that the level of immigrants' support for democracy changes the longer immigrants reside in Australia. The variable measuring immigrants' length of residence is not statistically significant and the value of its B coefficient is actually close to 0, which suggests that immigrants' support for democracy does not become stronger the longer they reside in Australia.<sup>20</sup> This supports hypothesis 3.<sup>21</sup>

Our findings thus support our first hypothesis ( $H_1$ ); immigrants from authoritarian regimes are less supportive of democracy than other people socialized in a democratic regime, and the more authoritarian their experience of politics, the weaker their democratic support. Arguably, the enduring influence of pre-migration experiences of authoritarianism is related to the different "political repertoires" that people socialized in democratic and authoritarian political regimes develop. Even if it is clear to immigrants from authoritarian regimes that democracy is the most desirable form of government, they still conceive of life as sustainable under these other forms of regimes. In comparison, because democracy has a monopoly in established democracies, to use Rose et al.'s expression (1998: 11), it is still possible that democracy more easily has a monopoly over people's loyalty; they have no points of comparison in their daily lives to judge the pros and cons of each regime, except for those received in their own socialization portraying other political regimes as inherently bad or wrong. Our empirical investigation now turns to the extent to which immigrants from authoritarian regimes participate in the democratic process.

## Participation in Electoral Activities

The second part of our analysis focuses on electoral participation. As part of the *AES*, respondents were asked whether they were involved in any of the following activities during the last election: (1) discussing their voting intention; (2) working for a party or candidate; (3) attending a political meeting; and (4) giving money to a party or candidate.<sup>22</sup> The findings reported in Table 4 show that there are significant differences in levels of participation between immigrants from authoritarian regimes and other respondents socialized in democratic regimes. Surprisingly, however, even

**Table 4.** Participation in the Democratic Process

	Local population	Immigrants from countries:	
		Democratic	Authoritarian
<i>2004 Australian Election Study</i>			
Electoral activities			
Discuss voting intention	31	32	54*
Work for party or candidate	15	15	28*
Attend political meetings	7	7	12*
Contribute money to party or candidate	6	4	12*
<i>N</i> <sup>1</sup>	1330	241	289

Notes: \*: t-test: difference with immigrants from democratic countries is statistically significant at least at .05 level.

1. Number of cases varies for each item. Numbers do not go below those reported.

Sources: *2004 Australian Election Study* and its over-sample of immigrants.

though immigrants from authoritarian regimes may be less supportive of democracy than other members of the population, the evidence consistently indicates that, if anything, pre-migration experiences of authoritarian regimes appear to boost participation in electoral activities, which is contrary to our first hypothesis.

First, while 31 percent and 32 percent of the Australian-born population and immigrants from democratic countries report having discussed their voting intention with acquaintances during the campaign, that proportion rises to 54 percent for immigrants from authoritarian regimes. Similarly, while 15 percent of our two groups of respondents socialized in a democracy report having worked for a party or candidate, that proportion almost doubles among immigrants from authoritarian regimes, with 28 percent reporting having done so. And the same pattern holds for both attending political meetings and contributing financially to a party or candidate: about twice as many immigrants from authoritarian regimes report having an involvement in those activities in comparison to the rest of the population. For each of the four electoral activities, immigrants from authoritarian regimes participate significantly more than either the Australian-born population or immigrants from democratic countries.

We conduct multivariate analyses separately for each of the four electoral activities to ensure that factors other than pre-migration experiences of authoritarianism do not account for the observed differences in Table 4. The multivariate analyses are performed for immigrant respondents only. The results reported in Table 5 indicate that there are a variety of factors that explain immigrants' involvement in electoral activities. But once we control for the socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants, pre-migration experiences of authoritarianism do not appear to systematically influence immigrants' electoral participation. The variable measuring past experience of authoritarianism is a statistically significant predictor only for discussing voting intention: the greater an immigrant's experience of authoritarianism, the greater the propensity to discuss her voting intention. For the other three electoral activities, past experience of authoritarianism exerts no significant influence once we include all our control variables in the analysis. There is therefore no support for the first hypothesis. It seems that immigrants' greater electoral participation is more a reflection of their socioeconomic characteristics (younger and more educated) than their pre-migration experience of politics.<sup>23</sup>

We also performed the analyses presented in Table 5 using our indicator of authoritarian experience that takes into account both the degree of authoritarian practices and the age at which immigrants left their country of origin. Once again, the results in Table 6 show that using this specification

**Table 5.** The Impact of Pre-migration Experiences of Authoritarianism on Electoral Participation

	Talk vote			Go to meeting			Work on campaign			Give money		
	B	RSE	Max.-min. prob. Δ	B	RSE	Max.-min. prob. Δ	B	RSE	Max.-min. prob. Δ	B	RSE	Max.-min. prob. Δ
<b>Authoritarian experience scale (0-12)</b>	.086	.029***	24	.024	.058	1	-.007	.034	-1	.038	.046	3
Length of residence	-.037	.014**	-26	-.029	.021	-6	-.037	.014**	-21	-.017	.016	-4
Age	.023	.013	39	.009	.018	3	.030	.014*	37	.001	.016	0
Female	.218	.270	5	.087	.572	0	.535	.313	8	.631	.504	4
Education	.132	.176	6	-.090	.216	-1	-.138	.186	-2	-.010	.227	0
Income	-.166	.112	-15	.103	.203	2	-.055	.123	-8	-.056	.192	-1
Employment status <sup>1</sup>												
Employed	.202	.372	5	-.214	.638	-1	.437	.404	7	.057	.629	0
Unemployed	.034	.524	1	1.259	.946	9	.693	.623	13	-.312	1.189	-2
Interest in politics	.610	.176***	37	.958	.470*	10	.331	.207	13	.499	.361	7
Left-wing ideology (0-5)	.153	.124	18	.093	.258	2	.121	.132	10	.068	.266	2
Right-wing ideology (0-5)	.108	.108	13	.707	.202	2	.132	.118	11	.099	.165	3
Satis. democracy	-.121	.199	-9	.065	.176	1	.016	.110	1	.370	.349	6
Materialist values	-.033	.099	-5	-.311		-12	-.124		-12	-.105	.187	-4
Constant	-2.007	1.005*		-4.054	1.866*		-2.552	1.133*		-4.102	1.681*	
N	294			294			297			295		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.108			.106			.061			.051		

Notes: Entries report logit B coefficients. Regressions with robust standard errors.

\*\*\*; p-value < .001; \*\*; p-value < .01; \*; p-value < .05.

1. Reference category is inactive.

Sources: 2004 Australian Election Study and its over-sample of immigrants.

**Table 6.** The Impact of Pre-migration Experiences of Authoritarianism on Electoral Participation (Degree of Authoritarian Practices × Age at Migration, 0–49 Scale)

	Talk vote			Go to meeting			Work on campaign			Give money		
	B	RSE	Max.-min. prob.Δ	B	RSE	Max.-min. prob.Δ	B	RSE	Max.-min. prob.Δ	B	RSE	Max.-Min. prob.Δ
<b>Authoritarian experience scale (0–49)</b>	.029	.009**	33	.015	.018	4	.001	.010	1	.015	.014	5
Length of residence	-.035	.015*	-25	-.022	.023	-4	-.033	.015*	-19	-.011	.018	-2
Age	.019	.013	32	.004	.018	2	.029	.014*	37	.004	.016	2
Female	.196	.273	5	.091	.576	0	.537	.314	8	.635	.508	4
Education	.099	.177	5	-.079	.216	-1	-.038	.187	-1	-.001	.227	0
Income	-.150	.114	-14	.120	.209	2	-.134	.124	-8	-.046	.196	-1
<b>Employment status<sup>1</sup></b>												
Employed	.105	.374	2	-.215	.634	-1	.449	.402	7	.045	.617	0
Unemployed	.016	.525	0	1.214	.954	9	.676	.628	12	-.346	1.198	-2
Interest in politics	.606	.179**	36	.975	.473*	10	.335	.208	14	.512	.364	8
Left-wing ideology (0–5)	.150	.123	18	.099	.245	3	.126	.131	11	.071	.266	2
Right-wing ideology (0–5)	.110	.111	13	.074	.203	2	.135	.118	12	.102	.165	4
Satis. democracy	-.097	.201	-7	.039	.322	1	.003	.210	0	.349	.350	5
Materialist values	-.013	.100	-2	-.323	.181	-12	-.129	.111	-13	-.109	.188	-4
Constant	-1.96	.977*		-4.147	1.828*		-2.626	1.090*		-4.077	1.628*	
N		291			291			294			292	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.114			.109			.059			.052	

Notes: Entries report logit B coefficients. Regressions with robust standard errors. \*\*p-value<.001; \*p-value<.01; .p-value<.05.

1. Reference category is inactive.

Sources: 2004 Australian Election Study and its over-sample of immigrants.

does not improve the explanatory power of our models. The relationship between the authoritarian experience and each of the four electoral activities remains the same: the experience of authoritarianism is a statistically significant and positive predictor only for discussing voting intention. Furthermore, the pseudo R-square for the analysis for discussing voting intention essentially remains the same (.114 vs. .108). It appears that we can produce just as accurate predictions about immigrants' electoral participation by only taking into account the degree of authoritarian practices in the country of origin, instead of both the degree of authoritarian practices and the length of time to which immigrants were exposed to such practices. Once again, there is not much support for the second hypothesis.

Finally, and intriguingly, the longer immigrants have lived in Australia, the less their propensity to work for a party or candidate and to discuss their voting intention. Table 5 indicates that the probability that immigrants will discuss their voting intention or work for a candidate drops by 26 and 21 points, respectively, after they have lived for 30 years in Australia.<sup>24</sup> This clearly highlights a drop in immigrants' political engagement. Why does participation decrease with length of residence and why does it affect only two of the four types of electoral activities? We cannot provide a satisfactory answer at this stage to these two questions.

Overall, there is little evidence that pre-migration experience of authoritarianism influences immigrants' participation in electoral activities in the host country. This finding contradicts research in the United States which showed that immigrants from authoritarian regimes actually tend to participate less than other immigrants (Bueker, 2005; Ramakrishan, 2005). First, it is possible that we are simply looking at distinct dependent variables. While other studies have examined voting, we examine other forms of electoral activities. Second, this could be an indication that Australia might be a special case because of its system of compulsory voting with effective enforcement. Compulsory voting could signal that not only voting but also other campaign activities are regarded as a civic duty, which could stimulate immigrants' involvement and equalize the levels of participation with those of the rest of the population. Further research is necessary to verify this possibility.

## **Conclusion**

This article has examined whether immigrants who leave authoritarian regimes to settle in an established democracy develop strong support for democracy and participate in electoral activities, and the extent to which pre-migration experiences influence their adaptation to democracy. In addition to providing crucial evidence regarding immigrants' adaptation to democracy, this article provides insights into the persistence of and change in people's political outlooks over their life cycle.

Our evidence provides support for the view that early socialization exerts an enduring impact on political outlooks, especially when it comes to support for democracy and other types of regimes. There is significant evidence that immigrants who experienced authoritarianism do not always see democracy as the only game in town, or at least less so than the rest of the population. Immigrants from authoritarian regimes exhibit overwhelming support for democracy per se, as much as the rest of the population does, but they also support authoritarian alternatives to democracy. It is not that immigrants reject democratic rules but rather that democracy is not the only acceptable option for a significant proportion of them. The portfolio of experiences that immigrants accumulate prior to moving to Australia appears to continue to shape their political outlooks long after they have lived in a political system completely different from that of their country of origin. Furthermore, the more authoritarian political practices in immigrants' countries of origin are, the



weaker their democratic support. This supports the first hypothesis: pre-migration experience of authoritarianism does influence immigrants' adaptation to democracy. What immigrants have learned early in life prior to migration continues to shape their political outlooks once in the host country, a conclusion consistent with most of the literature surveyed (Bilodeau, 2008; Gitelman, 1982; McAllister and Makkai, 1992). This suggests that enduring pre-migration dispositions impede to some extent immigrants' adaptation to democracy.

Our findings also showed that the degree of authoritarian practices in the country of origin to which immigrants were exposed appears to be a more important factor than the length of time to which immigrants were exposed to such practices. This conclusion fails to support the second hypothesis and is not consistent with McAllister and Makkai's (1992) study, also undertaken in Australia. It is likely that the different methodologies between the two studies could explain the discrepancy in findings: McAllister and Makkai (1992) were not taking into account the degree of authoritarian practices in their study, nor were they controlling for other socioeconomic factors. It also suggests an enduring impact of early political socialization: it is not how long immigrants have been exposed to authoritarian practices but rather the fact that they have been exposed to them that really matters. Finally, the lack of adaptation in immigrants' democratic support with length of residence further suggests an enduring impact of pre-migration experiences of authoritarianism and is consistent with the third hypothesis and with previous research on this specific matter (Bilodeau, 2008; Gitelman, 1982; McAllister and Makkai, 1992).

Importantly, these findings demonstrating the persistence of pre-migration experiences of authoritarianism hold even when it is considered that our samples are composed of immigrants who for the most part have lived many years in Australia – about three decades on average. This indicates that the adaptation to democracy can be challenging and that the authoritarian experience of politics can impede immigrants' adaptation. Of course, we do not know specifically what immigrants' attitudes were prior to coming to Australia, as our data are limited to immigrants' attitudes once in the host country. This limitation allows for alternative interpretations than the one emphasizing the endurance of pre-migration political experiences and a limited adaptation to democracy, especially in terms of democratic support. It is possible that our analysis is missing an important part of the story regarding immigrants' political outlooks. For example, our study suggests little adaptation in terms of democratic support; it is possible, however, that immigrants' democratic support has increased significantly compared with what it was in the country of origin but that we are missing that evolution because we are not able to measure exactly what immigrants' outlooks were prior to migration. Similarly, it is possible that immigrants' democratic support was higher prior to migration than it is in Australia, and that immigrants became disillusioned with democracy once in Australia. Nevertheless, even if we might be missing a part of the story, our findings suggest the persistent impact of immigrants' pre-migration political experiences. Immigrants' attitudes are consistent with what we would expect to find, were pre-migration socialization to shape political outlooks, and are consistent with previous studies highlighting the enduring impact of pre-migration political outlooks (Black, 1987; Bueker, 2005; Finifter and Finifter, 1989; Gitelman, 1982; Harles, 1997; McAllister and Makkai, 1992; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Rice and Feldman, 1997).

Even if our analyses suggested a strong endurance of pre-migration experience of authoritarianism and little adaptation in terms of democratic support, there is also evidence that immigrants' political learning does not stop when they leave their country of origin and that they are able to adapt to Australian democracy. Immigrants who experienced authoritarianism are active in expressing their political voice through electoral channels at least as much as the Australian-born population and other immigrants. It thus appears that the authoritarian experience does not

completely impede immigrants from learning about the ways citizens most often express their political voice in a democracy. Here the pre-migration experience of authoritarianism does not significantly impede immigrants' adaptation to democracy. Extensive involvement in political activities such as elections is a political outlook that we would not intuitively expect from people socialized in authoritarian regimes, and this suggests some change and new learning in immigrants' political socialization.

Overall, immigrants' political outlooks show the mark of both persistence and change in their socialization. Immigrants from authoritarian regimes are somewhat able to develop outlooks that match expectations in Australia (support democracy per se and participate in electoral activities), but they fail to fully leave behind their experiences, which leads them to support authoritarian alternatives to democracy. It is as if immigrants' outlooks were evolving but in a way that remains anchored in their past socialization; as if new learning experiences were added to old ones without replacing them, but rather only complementing them.

Such evidence is consistent with Mishler and Rose's (2002) model of cumulative lifetime learning in post-communist societies. According to their approach, political socialization is a process in which new "layers" of learning experiences are continuously added to previous ones and an individual's outlooks are the reflection of old and new "layers" of experiences. In the case of immigrants from authoritarian regimes, support for democracy per se and active participation in electoral activities would reflect the new "layer" of experiences, whereas support for the authoritarian alternatives would reflect the old "layer" of authoritarianism, both "layers" simultaneously influencing immigrants' political outlooks.

In conclusion, with new immigrants in Australia and other Western democracies increasingly arriving from authoritarian regimes, the issue of whether and how newcomers adapt to democracy will become even more salient in the future. This article tells part of the story about whether these new waves of immigrants accomplish their democratic transition. Evidence that immigrants from authoritarian regimes are active in electoral politics and are supportive of democracy is encouraging. First, it is legitimate to believe that immigrants' participation in the political process is a good starting point because it is by practicing democracy, as it is for any other citizens (Pateman, 1970), that immigrants will be most able to learn democracy and the roles democracy expects citizens to take on. Second, immigrants are responding positively to the political expectations of their new political system (they like democracy and participate in electoral politics). It is only in terms of the persistence of the old outlooks (supporting alternatives to democracy) that immigrants exhibit signs of concerns for the host political system. To the question "what happens to immigrants once they start a new life in a democracy after having lived most of their lives under authoritarian rules?" our answer would be that while they take on their new roles as democratic citizens, they simultaneously appear to struggle to leave behind their old roles of citizens of authoritarian regimes.

The question that populations and public officials in Australia and in any other society that hosts a large proportion of immigrants must now ask themselves is: what can we do to ensure that all citizens, old and new, share a common understanding of the rules of the game in our democracy? What policies and mechanisms could be put in place to help immigrants learn new roles and leave the old ones behind? And what role can immigrant networks and ethnic associations play in ensuring that newcomers become full citizens of their new democratic political system? These are questions that policy-makers and researchers in Western democracies need to address in responding to the new demographic reality of their own societies.

**Appendix A**

**Table A1.** Classification of Immigrants

Scale score	List of countries (n)	Sample size	% of immigrant sample
<b>2004 Australian Election Study and Its Special Sample of Immigrants</b>			
0			
No authoritarian practices	New Zealand (23); United Kingdom (149); Ireland (6); Northern Ireland (1); Scotland (1); Wales (1); Austria (1); France (1); Netherlands (13); Switzerland (4); Sweden (4); Italy (27); Malta (8); Canada (1); United States (3)	243	43.2%
1	Japan and the Koreans (1); Japan (9); Chile 1969–73 (3)	13	2.3%
2	Papua New Guinea (1); Fiji (1); Tonga (2); Israel (1); Lebanon 1955–74 (8); Mauritius (4)	17	3.0%
3	India (12); Sri Lanka 1970–85 (5); Malaysia 1974 (2); Samoa (1)	20	3.6%
4	Fiji (3); Lebanon 1976–80 (7); South Korea (1); Sri Lanka 1987 (2)	13	2.3%
5	Cyprus (3); Turkey (3); Malaysia 1978–87 (5); Philippines 1990–5 (7)	18	3.2%
6		0	0.0%
7	Argentina (1)	1	0.2%
8	Portugal (3); Kuwait (1); Lebanon 1994 (2); Indonesia (3); Philippines 1975–89 (7); Singapore (1); Taiwan (1); Brazil (1); Kenya (1); Zambia (1); Zimbabwe (1)	22	3.9%
9	Spain (2); Southeastern Europe (30); Egypt (7); Sudan (1); Chile 1985 (4); South Africa (6)	50	8.9%
10	Bosnia and Herzegovina (3); Bulgaria (1); Croatia (6); Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (4); Greece (20); Slovenia (1); Hungary (5); Lithuania (2); Poland (8); Russian Federation (1); Jordan (2); Laos (1); Ghana (1)	55	9.8%
11	Romania (1); Iraq (5); Burma (6); Ethiopia (2)	14	2.5%
12 Widespread authoritarian practices	Czech Republic (1); Syria (2); Cambodia (10); Vietnam (48); China (35)	96	17.1%
Total		562	100%
<b>2005 Australian component of the World Values Survey</b>			
0			
No authoritarian practices	New Zealand (20); United Kingdom (34); England (68); Northern Ireland (2); Scotland (16); Wales (5); Ireland (4); Austria (1); Belgium (1); Netherlands (7); Finland (1); Canada (4); United States (4)	167	51.7%

(Continued)

Table A1. (Continued)

Scale score	List of countries (n)	Sample size	% of immigrant sample
1	Italy (18); Malta (8); Chile 1969–73 (2); Seychelles (1)	29	9.0%
2	Papua New Guinea (2); Fiji (1); Israel (2); Lebanon 1955–74 (1)	6	1.9%
3	Cyprus (3); Hong Kong (6); India (7); Sri Lanka 1970–85 (2); Colombia (1); Mauritius (1)	20	6.2%
4	Philippines (3)	3	0.9%
5	Turkey (3); Malaysia 1978–87 (5); Peru (1); Uruguay (1)	10	3.1%
6	Mexico (1)	1	0.3%
7	Lebanon (1); Taiwan (2); Pakistan (1); Kenya (1)	5	1.5%
8	Philippines 1975–89 (5); Singapore (5); South Africa (7); Zimbabwe (1)	18	5.6%
9	Portugal (1); Indonesia (2); Ethiopia (1)	4	1.2%
10	Former Yugoslavia (4); Bosnia and Herzegovina (2); Croatia (5); Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (3); Greece (3); Slovenia (1); Hungary (4); Poland (10); Egypt (1)	33	10.2%
11	Romania (2); Czech Republic (2); Lithuania (1); Russian Federation (2); Slovakia (1); Ukraine (3)	11	3.4%
12 Widespread authoritarian practices	Cambodia (2); Vietnam (7); China (7)	16	5.0%
Total		323	100%

## Appendix B

Table B1. Construction of Variables

Authoritarian experience (0–12 scale)	Scale ranging from 0 to 12 based on the average Freedom House scores on civil liberties and political rights for the ten-year period prior to immigrants' departure where 0 means no authoritarian practices in the country of origin and 12 means widespread authoritarian practices.
Authoritarian experience (0–49 scale)	Scale ranging from 0 to 49 multiplying the degree of authoritarian practices in the country of origin (0–12 scale) by the log of the age at which immigrants left their country of origin, where 0 means no authoritarian experiences and 49 means an intense authoritarian experience of politics.
Support for democracy	Dichotomous variable where 1 means people support democracy and 0 means that they don't. Would you say it is a very good (1), fairly good (1), fairly bad (0) or very bad way (0) of governing this country to have a democratic political system?
Support for having a "strong leader"	Dichotomous variable where 1 means people support the following form of regime and 0 means that they do not. Would you say it is a very good (1), fairly good (1), fairly bad (0) or very bad way (0) of governing this country to have a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections?

(Continued)

**Table B1.** (Continued)

Support for having the army rule the country	Dichotomous variable where 1 means people support the following form of regime and 0 means that they don't. Would you say it is a very good (1), fairly good (1), fairly bad (0) or very bad way (0) of governing this country to have the army rule the country?
Exclusive support for democracy	Scale ranging from 0 to 9 adding the following three indicators: – Support for democracy: very good (3), fairly good (2), fairly bad (1) or very bad (0). – Support for a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections and parliament: very good (0), fairly good (1), fairly bad (2) or very bad (3). – Support for the army rule: very good (0), fairly good (1), fairly bad (2) or very bad (3). A score of 9 indicates respondents who strongly support democracy but strongly oppose repressive regimes. Conversely, 0 indicates respondents who strongly oppose democracy and strongly support repressive regimes.
Satisfaction with democracy	2004 AES: 4-point scale from 0 to 3 indicating whether respondents are satisfied with the way democracy evolves in the country, where 3 means strongly satisfied and 0 means strongly dissatisfied. 2005 WVS: 4-point scale from 0 to 3 indicating the extent to which respondents evaluate that the country is governed democratically, where 3 means the country is completely governed in a democratic way and 0 means that the country is not governed democratically at all.
Education	Three-point scale indicating whether respondents 0) did not finish high school, 1) completed high school and have some other technical degree, or 2) have some university education.
Age	Age in years.
Female	1 = female, 0 = male.
Income	1 to 5 scale for household income in quintiles.
Employment status	Employed: 1 = full time or part time employed, 0 = all others. Unemployed: 1 = unemployed, 0 = all others Reference category: disabled, retired, housewife, student
Interest in politics	4-point scale from 0 to 3 indicating level of interest in politics, where 3 means a strong interest in politics and 0 means no interest at all.
Electoral participation, 2004 AES only	Four dummy variables indicating whether or not respondents have been involved in the last election in the following activities. 1) discussing their vote intention, 2) working for a party or candidate, 3) attending a political meeting, and 4) giving money to a party or candidate.
Materialist values	0 to 6 scale where 6 means strong materialist values and 0 means strong post-materialist values. Based on the addition of the following three questions: People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Listed below are some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Please indicate which one of these you consider the most important? And which would be the next most important?

(Continued)

**Table B1.** (Continued)

	<p>1. A. A high level of economic growth, B. Making sure this country has strong defence forces, C. Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities, or D. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.</p> <p>Two points were given when respondents identified both choices C and D as first and/or second choice. One point was given when respondents identified only choice C or D.</p> <p>2. A. Maintaining order in the nation, B. Giving people more say in important government decisions, C. Fighting rising prices, or D. Protecting freedom of speech</p> <p>Two points were given when respondents identified both choices B and D as first and/or second choice. One point was given when respondents identified only choice B or D.</p> <p>3. A. A stable economy, B. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society, C. Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money, or D. The fight against crime.</p> <p>Two points were given when respondents identified both choices B and C as first and/or second choice. One point was given when respondents identified only choice B or C.</p>
Left-right self-placement	<p>Left-wing ideology: scale ranging from 0 to 5 where 5 indicates a far left ideology and 0 a right or centre ideology.</p> <p>Right-wing ideology: scale ranging from 0 to 5 where 5 indicates a far right ideology and 0 a left or centre ideology.</p>
Length of residence	Number of years spent in Australia.

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## Notes

1. See Trewin (2007). The classification used for authoritarian regimes is based on the Freedom House Index.
2. "SETTLER ARRIVALS, 1995–96 to 2005–06, Australia States and Territories" – Table 1.2, URL: <http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics/index.htm>; "Immigration – Federation to Century's End 1901–2001" – Part 4, Table 1, URL: <http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics/index.htm>. The classification used for authoritarian regimes is based on the Freedom House Index.
3. There is debate about whether political socialization is the specific process of the "molding of the child to some a priori model, usually one perpetuating the status quo" (Kinder and Sears, 1985: 714) or whether it corresponds to a more open process of political learning through which individuals develop their own political attitudes and understanding of the world (see Conover [1991] for a review of the debate). However, the question of the persistence of or change in political socialization that we address in this article is a distinct and independent issue from the range of phenomena that political socialization encompasses.
4. Ramakrishnan (2005), however, demonstrates that having lived under a repressive regime reduces the likelihood of voting only among certain groups of immigrants, namely white and



non-Cuban Latinos, but has no effect for other groups of immigrants. Also, it is worth noting that Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) found that coming from a repressive regime generally did not have an impact on immigrants' voting habits in the United States.

5. Scholars of transitional democracies make a distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; our definition of authoritarian regimes here includes both types of regimes. For a discussion of the different types of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, see Linz (1975).
6. There may be many reasons why immigrants from authoritarian regimes seek to start a new life in a democratic country, not all of which involve an overwhelming desire to embrace democracy. Some people, for example, may decide to migrate because of poor economic conditions. Others may do so in order to flee from natural catastrophes. And still others may decide to migrate in order to pursue lucrative business opportunities or to reunite with family members who have already migrated. Accordingly, another important distinction that could conceivably have an impact on immigrants' adaptation to democracy is whether they migrated voluntarily or not. Unfortunately, it is not possible to take into account the specific reasons why immigrants decided to migrate in the first place.
7. Additional historical sources are used for immigrants who arrived in Australia before 1973; Freedom House first published its Freedom Index in 1973.
8. Please refer to Freedom House for information on the measurement of civil liberties and political rights.
9. The 2004 *AES* and the over-sample of immigrants were conducted using self-completion (mail out – mail back) questionnaires. The response rates were 45 percent and 35 percent respectively for the main sample and the over-sample. The 2005 Australian component of the *WVS* was also conducted using self-completion (mail out – mail back) questionnaires. The response rate was 43 percent. For more information about the surveys' methodology, please contact [assda@anu.edu.au](mailto:assda@anu.edu.au).
10. The samples were obtained using the Australian electoral roll.
11. See Appendix B for the construction of the variables.
12. Both surveys also asked respondents whether they thought it was a good or a bad way to govern this country to have experts, not the government, make decisions according to what they think best for the country. We did not retain this item for the analyses because this form of government is not as obviously non-democratic as the other two. Analyses were also performed using this item; support for this form of government is much larger than for the other two, and immigrants from authoritarian regimes also exhibit stronger support for this form of government than respondents socialized in a democracy. According to the *AES*, 28 percent and 38 percent of the local population and immigrants from democratic countries support the statement, while 49 percent of immigrants from authoritarian regimes do so. According to the *WVS*, 44 percent and 43 percent of the local population and immigrants from democratic countries expressed support for this form of political system, and 59 percent of immigrants from authoritarian regimes do so.
13. It is also possible that exposure to civic education courses in the country of origin or in Australia might help explain whether immigrants exhibit exclusive support for democracy. Research in Western democracies (Niemi and Junn, 1998) and in countries in transition to democracy (Finkel, 2002; Morduchowicz et al., 1996) indicates that civic education courses have a significant impact in teaching people democratic values and political knowledge. Therefore, immigrants who have taken civic courses in their country of origin could be more

supportive of democracy and more likely to reject authoritarian alternatives. Similarly, once in Australia, immigrants who take civic courses in the Australian school system, or simply attend school in Australia, could also more easily than other immigrants develop support for democracy and reject its authoritarian alternatives. Unfortunately, the data employed for this study do not indicate whether immigrants have followed civic education courses in or prior to coming to Australia; nor do the data indicate for how many years immigrants have attended the Australian school system. Even though he did not examine the impact of civic education courses per se, Bilodeau (2006) nevertheless provides evidence to answer this question regarding the impact of pre- and post-migration education on the political adaptation of immigrants in Canada. Bilodeau demonstrates that immigrants from authoritarian regimes who attended school in Canada did not exhibit stronger democratic outlooks (participation, efficacy, and support for democratic principles) than immigrants who did not attend school in Canada. Furthermore, he observes that while newcomers' pre-migration education attained in a democratic regime favors the development of stronger democratic outlooks, newcomers' pre-migration education attained in an authoritarian regime does not favor, or only weakly favors, the development of stronger democratic outlooks.

14. Please see Appendix B for more information on the construction of the variables.
15. Please refer to Appendix B for the similarities in the question wording and to notes 8 and 9 for the similarities in the methodologies of the two surveys.
16. Separate analyses indicate a significant impact of broadly similar magnitude for both the *AES* and the *WVS* Australia data (B coefficients equal  $-.060$  and  $-.106$  respectively). The results are not presented.
17. Because most cases are clustered in the "pro-democracy" end of the scale, we performed additional analyses to ensure that this would not skew the results of the OLS regression. We recoded the "support for democracy" variable to regroup the categories 0 to 5 together, which represent 19 percent of the cases. The other cases are more or less equally distributed in the remaining categories of the "support for democracy" variable. We reran the OLS analysis using the recoded "support for democracy" variable and the results are essentially the same; we also reran the analysis using the recoded "support for democracy" variable but this time with ordered logit analysis, and once again the same results are observed. The authoritarian experience variable still decreases support for democracy and is still the most powerful predictor of the analysis. The results are not presented.
18. The correlation between the variable measuring the experience of authoritarianism that takes into account both the degree of authoritarian practices and age at migration and immigrants' age is  $-.126$  (Pearson coefficient).
19. The correlation between the exclusive support for democracy scale and satisfaction with democracy is  $.110$  (Pearson coefficient).
20. We also examined the impact of length of residence for immigrants from authoritarian regimes only, and the same results were observed. Support for democracy does not become stronger the longer immigrants from authoritarian regimes reside in Australia. Even when testing non-linear specifications of length of residence, no significant impact is observed. The results are not presented.
21. The correlation between immigrants' age and their length of residence is  $.606$  (Pearson coefficient). Length of residence is not statistically significant even if we remove age from the model, and this holds for both specifications of pre-migration authoritarian experience (results not presented).

22. Note that voter turnout is not included in the analysis because Australia has a policy of compulsory voting with an enforcement mechanism; turnout generally reaches around 94 percent in federal elections.
23. Immigrants from authoritarian regimes are on average 48.7 years old, while immigrants from democratic countries are on average 56.8 years old; 25.6 percent of immigrants from authoritarian regimes have some form of post-secondary education, while 19.4 percent of immigrants from democratic countries do.
24. Predicted probabilities are obtained by taking every other independent variable in the model at their sample means. The Max.-min. probability change in tables 5 and 6 of the length of residence is calculated as a change from 1 year of residence to 30 years of residence, whereas the Max.-min. probabilities for the other independent variables are calculated as the difference between the maximum and the minimum values.

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